Resumo Este trabalho examina a importância relativa de valores e interesses na política externa de Obama, focando-se em casos críticos: as ações militares relacionadas a Afeganistão, Iraque, Líbia, não-Síria, Al-Qaeda e ISIL. Argumenta-se que sua estratégia de "leading from behind" não é muito diferente das estratégias de política externa e de defesa de seus predecessores no pós-Guerra Fria, nas quais a democracia é vista como garantia de segurança. De acordo com a estratégia de Obama, os americanos apenas apoiariam indiretamente a construção da democracia nos países-alvo, enquanto esta tarefa deveria ser realizada pelos próprios habitantes locais. Eles também proveriam treinamento militar para que os novos governos se tornassem responsáveis por sua própria segurança, o que incluía prevenir que grupos terroristas se reagrupassem em seus territórios. Se Obama se opõe à imposição da democracia pelo uso da força, os dados empíricos mostram que sua administração "não está disposta a aceitar" qualquer alternativa que ameace a segurança ou os valores liberais democráticos dos Estados Unidos, juntando desta maneira valores e interesses em sua política externa.

Abstract This study will exam the relative importance of values and interests in Obama's foreign policy, focusing on crucial cases: the military actions related to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Non-Syria, Al-Qaeda and ISIL. We will argue that his "leading from behind" strategy is not very distant from the foreign and defense strategies of his post-Cold War predecessors, by which democracy is seen as an assurance to security. According to Obama's strategy, Americans will only provide support for the building of democracy in the target countries, while this task should be performed by the locals themselves. Americans will provide military training to the new governments as well so they can be responsible for their own security, including preventing regrouping of terrorists in their soil. If Obama opposes the imposing of democracy by the use of force, empirical data shows that his administration is "not prepared to accept" any option that threats US security or American liberal-democratic values, bringing in this way values and interests very close to each other.

Todos sabem que a democracia teve um papel importante na Doutrina Bush. O que nem todos sabem é que esse papel foi essencial para que a doutrina pudesse ser posta em operação, sob a qual a invasão do Iraque foi preparada e conduzida. Será argumentado também que, ainda que agressiva, a Doutrina Bush é compatível com a Tradição Liberal americana. Para demonstrar esses argumentos, serão analisados os vínculos entre democracia, segurança e os interesses nacionais americanos, conforme identificados nos pilares da política externa americana desde o fim da Guerra Fria. A crença da administração Bush nos efeitos positivos da exportação de democracia pela força para o Afeganistão e para o Iraque no combate ao terrorismo será destacada. Será mostrado, contudo, que entre as justificativas e motivações para as intervenções militares nos dois países, as razões de segurança prevaleceram sobre preocupações democráticas, embora esta última esteja significativamente presente desde as primeiras horas após o 11 de setembro. Depois que se tornou claro, no entanto, que as armas de destruição em massa não existiam no Iraque, a exportação de democracia como arma definitiva de combate ao terrorismo cresceu significativamente como justificativa para as invasões dos rogue states e se sobrepôs às motivações de segurança. O artigo usa a análise de conteúdo qualitativa e quantitativa dos discursos do Presidente Bush e de seus Secretários de Estado e Defesa.

Everyone knows that democracy played a role in the Bush Doctrine. What not everyone knows is that this role was essential for the doctrine to be put into operation under which the Iraq invasion was prepared and launched. We argue moreover that, even if aggressive, the Bush doctrine is compatible with the American Liberal Tradition. To demonstrate these arguments we analyze the links between democracy, security, and the US national interests as expressed in the pillars of the American foreign policy since the end of Cold War. The consequential belief of the Bush Administration on the positive effect of exporting democracy by the use of force to Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terrorism will be remarked. It will be shown, however, that in the first years of the Bush Administration, among the justifications for the military interventions in the two countries, security reasons prevailed over democratic concerns, although the latter was significantly present since the early hours after September 11. It was only when it became clear that WMDs did not exist in Iraq that the exporting of democracy as the ultimate weapon to fight terrorism grew remarkably and prevailed over security reasons to invade those rogue states. The paper uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the speeches of President Bush and his Secretaries of State and Defense.

O artigo analisa os pilares da política externa americana no pós-guerra fria, mirando o lugar que ai ocupa democracia e sua relação com segurança. Busca-se mais especificamente as bases da doutrina da política externa que justificam a exportação de democracia pelo uso da força. Utilizou-se a análise de conteúdo quantitativa e qualitativa de 415 discursos dos Presidentes e Secretários de Estado entre 1989 e 2008.

The article analyses the pillars of the American foreign policy in the post-cold war period, focusing on the importance democracy vis-à-vis security plays in it as well as their relationship. More specifically the work aims to define the bases of the doctrine of the foreign policy that justify exporting democracy by the use of force. It was used quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 414 speeches of the Presidents and Secretaries of States in the period 1989-2008.

O fim da Guerra Fria e a redefinição da ordem internacional, a globalização e a intensificação dos diversos processos de integração internacional e a fragmentação nacional, em conjunto, induziram mudanças nos conceitos de segurança e defesa. O papel das Forças Armadas na América Latina tem sido definido (e mesmo imposto) desde o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial pelo hegemon e seu bloco militar aliado, a Otan. O propósito deste artigo é analisar como os militares percebem e reagem a essa nova função. Os conceitos de segurança e defesa são revistos, levando-se em consideração as ameaças vindas de fora e de dentro das fronteiras nacionais, tanto em países desenvolvidos, como em desenvolvimento. A análise tomará o Brasil como referência empírica. Os militares brasileiros estão ainda confusos sobre sua missão no mundo pós-Guerra Fria, e isso traz conseqüências importantes para a política de defesa do país e sua adequação aos novos parâmetros de segurança internacional.

The end of the Cold War and the redefinition of the international order, the globalization and intensification of transnational integration, and the so-called national fragmentation, altogether, have induced changes in the concepts of both security and defense. Both the hegemon and NATO, its military allied bloc, have redefined (and even imposed) the role of Latin American armed forces since the end of the Second World War. The article aims at analyzing the way the military in Latin America has perceived and reacted to this new role. The concepts of security and defense are revised, regarding as threats those coming either from outside or inside the national borders, both in developed and developing countries. The analysis takes Brazil as the empirical reference. The Brazilian military are still confused about their new mission in the post-Cold War world, and that brings important consequences to both the country defense policy and its adequacy to the new parameters of international security.

La fin de la Guerre Froide et la redéfinition de l'ordre international, la globalisation et l'intensification des divers processus d'intégration internationale ainsi que la fragmentation nationale ont, ensemble, conduit à de nouvelles approches des concepts de sécurité et de défense à des changements. Le rôle des forces armées en Amérique Latine a été défini (on peut même dire imposé) depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale par l'hegemon et son bloc militaire allié, l'OTAN. Le but de cet article est d'analyser de quelle façon les militaires perçoivent et réagissent à cette nouvelle fonction. Les concepts de sécurité et de défense sont revus, en considérant les menaces venant de l'extérieur et de l'intérieur des frontières nationales, aussi bien dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement. Cette analyse a choisi le Brésil comme référence empirique. Les militaires brésiliens sont encore confus à propos de leur mission dans le monde de l'après Guerre Froide, ce qui a de conséquences importantes pour la politique de défense du pays et de son adéquation aux nouveaux paramètres de sécurité internationale.

Is the western liberal model of democracy adequate to analyze the new political regimes of the Third Wave of Democracy? After reviewing the recent literatures on democratization and economic reform, I refer to their signifying concepts, namely, governability, governance and democracy, as well as to their implicit normative biases. I give especial attention to the concept of democracy as used by those literatures, based on the so-called procedural minimum (Schumpeter/Dahl). Considered too minimum by leading authors, this definition has been expanded to include "precising" attributes. Rather than augmenting even further Dahl’s list, I here propose to include in the regime change investigation the characteristics of the decision-making process, as an analytical tool to characterize the new political systems on their own terms. I claim that this approach better exams the more or less democratic character of the building regimes in the period between elections, bringing to the fore the question of vertical accountability of the bureaucracies, issue unsatisfactorily treated by democracy theorists. The policy process approach allows as well for the identification of different types of democracy which differently combine characteristics of decision-making. Finally, with reference to the Brazilian case, I consider the type of political regime the emerging countries are able or willing to build, offering some working hypotheses to analyze them.

Le modèle de démocratie libérale occidentale serait-il approprié à une analyse des nouveaux régimes politiques de la Troisième Vague démocratique? Dans cet article, après une récapitulation de la littérature sur la démocratisation et la réforme économique, on fait état de quelques concepts significatifs: gouvernabilité, gouvernance et démocratie, ainsi que de leurs biais normatifs implicites. On a examiné surtout le concept de démocratie qui se fonde sur le procedural minimum de Schumpeter/Dahl. Bien que considérée trop étroite par des auteurs importants, cette définition de démocratie, qui a reçu des qualificatifs la précisant davantage, a gagné du terrain. Au lieu d’en rajouter d’autres à la liste de Dahl, on propose ici qu’on tienne compte, lors de l’étude des régimes en changement, des caractéristiques du processus de décision en tant qu’instrument analytique à même d’identifier les nouveaux systèmes politiques selon leurs propres termes. Cette approche semble plus pertinente pour l’examen du caractère plus ou moins démocratique des régimes en construction dans les périodes entre les élections, faisant ressortir la question du contrôle vertical des bureaucraties, insuffisamment traitée par la théorie démocratique. On réussit à identifier aussi différents types de démocratie qui associent de façon diverse les caractéristiques de leur processus de décision. Enfin, à partir du cas brésilien, on présente quelques considérations sur le type de régime politique que les pays émergents sont capables de construire, ou se disposent à construire, tout en leur suggérant quelques hypothèses de travail et d’analyse.

The article first offers some considerations regarding the concepts governability and government as used in the recent literature and, for analytical purposes, suggests the term governing capacity. In a context of economic reforms and democratization, Executive-Legislative relations form one of the key elements of governing capacity. Contesting Brazilian literature on this topic, the article grounds itself in basic policies on the agendas of the Collor and Itamar Franco administrations to argue that if there is a deficit in the implementation of a good share of economic stabilization policies and policies to open up trade, produced within relatively insulated bureaucracies, at the same time the structural reform policies submitted to Congress (social welfare, privatization, administration, taxation) have fallen short not just in the realm of implementation but in the realm of formulation as well. Underscoring the complexity of the policy-making phase, the text cites some causes, such as problems the government encounters in building stable majorities within Congress. Given this difficulty, the Executive must often engage in tough negotiations to get governmental policies approved, and it ends up entering into a pattern of conflict in its interactions with the Legislative branch. As a consequence, government leaders are tempted to favor the relatively insulated arena of bureaucracies over the parliament, with foreseeable consequences for the process of democratization within Brazil. Based on this scenario, the article asks what type of democracy Brazil can or is willing to build

Dans cet article on confronte tout d’abord les concepts de gouvernabilité et d’état de gouvernance selon l’usage qu’en fait la littérature actuelle, tout en suggérant aux chercheurs d’employer la formule "capacité à gouverner". Compte tenu du contexte des réformes économiques et de démocratisation, l’un des éléments essentiels de cette capacité à gouverner consiste dans l’établissement de bons rapports entre le pouvoir exécutif et le législatif. A partir de l’étude des politiques de fond des gouvernements Collor et Itamar Franco, l’auteur se démarque de la littérature brésilienne sur le sujet pour affirmer que si, d’un côté, la plupart des politiques de stabilisation et de libéralisation économique – produit de burocraties relativement isolées – sont insuffisamment appliquées, d’autre côté les politiques de réforme structurelle (sécurité sociale, privatisations, réformes administrative et fiscale) soumises au Congrès présentent des défauts de formulation et de mise en place. On relève la complexité du stade de formulation de ces politiques, tout en montrant les causes, parmi lesquelles la difficulté du gouvernement de construire une majorité stable au Congrès. Ce fait mène souvent le pouvoir exécutif à des négociations difficiles en vue de faire approuver sa politique et, par conséquent, à des niveaux d’échange conflictuels avec le pouvoir législatif. Les gouvernants sont donc tentés de privilégier le camp relativement restreint des burocraties au détriment du parlement, ce qui a de claires conséquences sur le processus de démocratisation du pays. C’est à partir de ce cadre que se pose la question de savoir quel type de démocratie nous pouvons ou nous sommes prêts à construire